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NOTES
ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE GATHERING AND THE
OMNIBUS CRIME CONTROL AND SAFE
STREETS ACT OF 1968
I. INTRODUCTION
In Berger v. New York' the Supreme Court reversed a bribery conspiracy
conviction that was based on evidence obtained by means of a court au-
thorized "bug ' 2 installed in the defendant's office pursuant to a state statute.
In Katz v. United States3 the Supreme Court reversed a gambling conviction
that was based on evidence obtained by means of a bug placed, without prior
judicial authorization, upon the outside of a phone booth that the defendant
had used. In both cases, the Court held electronic surveillance subject to the
requirements of the fourth amendment.4 The constitutional defect found in
Berger was that the statute contained inadequate procedural standards and
safeguards. 5 The Katz Court held that, although the bug would have been
constitutional if prior judicial approval had been obtained, failure to obtain
such approval was fatal. 6
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 19687 was
1. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
2. A "bug" is a device used to intercept oral communications not transmitted by wire. It is to
be distinguished from a wiretap which is used to intercept communications transmitted by wire.
Both are included in the terms "electronic eavesdropping" and "electronic surveillance." For a
discussion of the various devices that may be used to conduct surveillance see A. Westin, Privacy
and Freedom 67-89 (1967).
3. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
4. Id. at 353; 388 U.S. at 50-53.
5. 388 U.S. at 58-60. The following is a list of the defects found in the New York statute
taken from Committee Report, Judicial Procedures for National Security Electronic Surveillance,
29 Record of N.Y.C.B.A. 751, 753 (1974) (analyzing S. 2820, an amendment to Title Ill
proposed by Senator Nelson) [hereinafter cited as Committee Report]: "I. It failed to provide that
a warrant could be issued only upon a showing of probable cause. 2. It failed to require a
description with particularity of the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized.
3. It failed to require a description with particularity of the crime that had been, was being, or
was about to be committed. 4. It failed to require a description with particularity of the type of
conversation to be seized. 5. It failed to place any limitations on the officer executing the
eavesdropping order which would prevent his searching unauthorized areas, and prevent his
searching further once the property sought had been seized. 6. It failed to require a showing of
probable cause in seeking a renewal of the eavesdropping order. 7. It failed to require dispatch in
executing the order. 8. It failed to require that the officer to whom the order was issued return to
the issuing court and show what had been seized. 9. It failed to require a showing of exigent
circumstances to overcome the defect of not giving prior notice to those whose privacy had been
invaded. 10. It failed to limit such orders to a time period equivalent to a single search, but
instead authorized eavesdropping for a two-month period, which amounted to a series of searches
and seizures pursuant to a single showing of probable cause."
6. 389 U.S. at 358-59.
7. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1970). The Act has been referred to by at least one of its critics as
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enacted in an attempt to comply with Katz and Berger.8 Section 2518 of that
title contains the procedural requirements for obtaining an "order"9 authoriz-
ing electronic surveillance, 10 and section 2511(3) specifies some of the types of
surveillance to which the title does not extend."
In United States v. United States District Court (Keith)12 the Supreme
Court held that the fourth amendment requires that judicial approval be
obtained before the government conducts electronic surveillance of domestic
organizations for the purpose of gathering national security intelligence. Since
no warrant had been obtained in that case, it was unnecessary to consider the
question of whether the procedural requirements of Title III are applicable to
such surveillances, and the Court declined to do so. 13 More recently, in
Zweibon v. Mitchell, 14 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia was
divided over the issue. In Zweibon, the Court of Appeals sat en banc to
consider the legality of a warrantless wiretap placed on the telephones of
members of the Jewish Defense League for the purpose of gathering intelli-
gence information concerning activities of that group which might have been
harmful to America's relations with the Soviet Union. The majority of the
court was of the opinion that the fourth amendment requires that a judicial
warrant be obtained before a wiretap is installed on a "domestic organization
that is neither the agent of nor acting in collaboration with a foreign
power"---even where the activities of such a group endanger the national
security by antagonizing a foreign power.' 5
Judge Wright, speaking for the plurality, stated that, "Congress intended
the procedures and remedies of Title III to apply to all Executive surveillance
which, under the Constitution, must be initiated pursuant to judicial war-
rant.' 1 6 Judge Wilkey, with whom Judge MacKinnon was in substantial
agreement and who concurred with the plurality on the constitutional issues,
"strongly disagree[d] with the plurality's view that the strict procedural
requirements of Title III-and, concomitantly, the damages provision con-
the "End to Privacy Act." S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 182 (1968) (Views of Senator
Fong) [hereinafter cited as Senate Report].
8. Senate Report, supra note 7, at 66.
9. An "order" under the federal statute would be a "warrant" in most other contexts. For
consistency "warrant" will be used herein except where the context requires otherwise.
10. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1970). In United States v. Turner, No. 73-2740 at 18-19(9th Cir.,July 24,
1975) (per curiam), the Ninth Circuit became the tenth of the circuits to uphold the constitutionality
of Title M. The Tenth Circuit was the first, United States v. Cox, 449 F.2d 679 (10th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 934 (1972), and the First shall be last.
11. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (1970). This includes the so-called "national security proviso."
Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 641 & n.219 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (plurality opinion); see text
accompanying notes 19 & 34 infra.
12. 407 U.S. 297, 321 (1972). This decision is called the Keith case after District Judge
Damon Keith against whom this mandamus proceeding was brought in order to prevent
disclosure of electronic surveillance information to a criminal defendant.
13. Id. at 321-22; see Senate Report, supra note 7, at 94.
14. 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc).
15. Id. at 614 (plurality opinion); id. at 689 (Wilkey, J., concurring & dissenting).
16. Id. at 669 (plurality opinion).
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tained in section 2520-are applicable to these special kinds of surveillance."'17
In response to Zweibon, Attorney General Levi said that, "[ift is the position
of the Department of Justice ... that such surveillance is not regulated by the
special procedural provisions of Title ilI.' s
This Note will explore the arguments on both sides of the dispute
regarding the applicability of Title I as well as the more important pro-
cedural requirements of section 2518. The analysis will encompass the under-
lying constitutional and policy considerations and the applicability of those
considerations in the context of electronic surveillance that is intended to
produce intelligence information rather than evidence of criminal activity.
1I. THE DISPUTE: THE APPLICABILITY OF TITLE I
A. Background: The Title III Disclaimer'9
Section 2511(3) of Title 18 of the United States Code provides:
Nothing contained in this chapter or in section 605 of the Communications Act of
1934 .... shall limit the constitutional power of the President to take such measures
as he deems necessary to protect the Nation against actual or potential attack or other
hostile acts of a foreign power, to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed
essential to the security of the United States, or to protect national security information
against foreign intelligence activities. Nor shall anything contained in this chapter be
deemed to limit the constitutional power of the President to take such measures as he
deems necessary to protect the United States against the overthrow of the Government
by force or other unlawful means, or against any other clear and present danger to the
structure or existence of the Government. The contents of any wvire or oral communi-
cation intercepted by authority of the President in the exercise of the foregoing powers
may be received in evidence in any trial hearing, or other proceeding only where such
interception was reasonable, and shall not be otherwise used or disclosed except as is
necessary to implement that power. 20
On its face, this provision would appear to anticipate that, once the courts
resolved the questions related to the President's power to conduct electronic
surveillance without a warrant-which questions were unresolved when the
provision was written-the procedural requirements of the rest of Title M
would apply in all cases in which, as a matter of constitutional law, the
President must obtain a judicial warrant. The issue is not so easily resolved,
however, since the procedural requirements of the rest of Title M were
17. Id. at 692-93 (Wilkey, J., concurring & dissenting); see id. at 706 (MacKinnon, J.,
concurring & dissenting).
18. Department of Justice Release (July 9, 1975). The Justice Department is apparently in the
process of developing its own guidelines, but it has declined to make them public. N.Y. Times,
Aug. 14, 1975, at 1, col. 6; see Address by the Hon. Edward H. Levi, A.B.A. Convention,
Department of Justice Release 9-18 (August 13, 1975) [hereinafter cited as Levi Address].
19. "Disclaimer" is the term ordinarily used to characterize 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (1970). E.g.,
Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 663 (D.C. Cir. 197S) (plurality opinion); id. at 693 (Wilkey,
J., concurring & dissenting). The term "saving clause" has also been used. Levi Address, supra
note 18, at 12.
20. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (1970).
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designed for use in the context of criminal investigations, 2' and some of those
provisions may be inapplicable in an intelligence gathering context. For
example, under section 2518(3)(a), the judge who issues a warrant authorizing
the interception of wire or oral communications must first determine that
"there is probable cause for belief that an individual is committing, has
committed, or is about to commit a particular offense enumerated in section
2516 of this chapter .... -22 Since section 2516 lists only criminal offenses,
23
this provision is obviously not designed for use by a judge authorizing a
wiretap intended to afford government officials advance warning of non-
criminal activities of domestic groups that may antagonize foreign powers.
B. Background: The Keith/Zweibon Gap
In Keith, the Supreme Court held that a warrant is required in cases
involving the domestic aspects of national security intelligence gathering,
2 4
and in Zweibon the Court of Appeals extended that requirement to cases with
a foreign affairs aspect.2 5 These cases, and perhaps others, fall within a gap
between ordinary criminal surveillance to which Title III plainly applies and
that category of surveillance, which the courts have not yet defined, 26 for
which no warrant need be obtained. The issue becomes, therefore, what
standards and procedures must be complied with in order to obtain the
requisite warrant in the Keith/Zweibon situation?
There are three possibilities: the courts could apply Title III, making such
modifications as are found necessary to reconcile the intent of Congress with
21. See Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 695-96 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Wilkey, J., concurring &
dissenting); Hearings on Practices and Procedures of thp Departnlent of Justice for Warrantless
Wiretapping and Other Electronic Surveillance Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice
and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1972) (remarks of
Senator Kennedy) [hereinafter cited as 1972 Hearings]; Levi Address, supra note 18, at 12; note
54 infra and accompanying text.
22. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a) (1970).
23. Id. § 2516(1)(a)-(g) (1970).
24. 407 U.S. at 314-21; accord, United States v. Smith, 321 F. Supp. 424, 429 (C.D. Calif.
1971).
25. 516 F.2d at 653-55.
26. Assuming that Zweibon is upheld, the only category left is national security surveillance
of foreign powers, their agents and collaborators. The Zweibon plurality expressed, in dictum,
the view that the warrant requirement applies even to that category of surveillance. Zweibon v.
Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (plurality opinion); accord, Joint Hearings on
Warrantless Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Before the Subcomm. on Administrative
Practice and Procedure & the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Surveillance of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 72 (1974) (testimony of Ramsey Clark) [hereinafter cited as 1974 Hearings]; id. at
310 (testimony of William Ruckelshaus). Contra, United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d S93, 606
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 881 (1974); United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 426 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960 (1974); United States v. Hoffman, 334 F. Supp. 504, 507
(D.D.C. 1971). See generally Note, Foreign Security Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment, 87
Harv. L. Rev. 976 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Harv. Note].
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the unique requirements of intelligence gathering;27 the courts could disregard
Title II and begin to develop constitutional requirements on an ad hoc basis
as was done in Berger and Katz prior to the enactment of Title I;28 or,
finally, the Congress could enact legislation amending Title In. This last
alternative was suggested in Keith,29 and some movement has been made in
that direction.
30
C. The Zweibon Plurality's Position
The Zweibon plurality took the position that Title III applies to all
electronic surveillance which must be initiated by a warrant. The plurality
explained that section 2511 makes all electronic surveillance illegal except as
provided elsewhere in Title 111. 31 It interpreted the disclaimer in subsection
three to be an expression of Congress' intent to make the application of Title
II dependent upon future constitutional adjudication by the courts. 32 In
other words, in the plurality's view, Congress intended Title IIl to apply to
any electronic surveillance which the courts might hold to be constitutionally
subject to a warrant requirement. Four factors weighed in favor of this
conclusion. First, Title III represents an attempt by Congress to treat the field
of electronic surveillance in a comprehensive manner. 33 The creation or
recognition of exceptions to the requirements of that title would therefore be
in derogation of congressional intent.34 Second, one of the policies underlying
27. This was suggested by the Zweibon plurality, 516 F.2d at 669, and criticized by the
minority. Id. at 697 (Wilkey, J., concurring & dissenting); id. at 707 (MacKinnon, J., concurring
& dissenting).
28. See notes 5-6 supra and accompanying text. See also notes 36, 44 infra and accompan)ing
text.
29. 407 U.S. at 322-33.
30. See Report on Warrantless Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance by the Subcomm. on
Surveillance of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations & the Subcomm. on Administrative
Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 n.1
(Comm. Print 1975); 1974 Hearings, supra note 26, at 4 (opening statement of Senator Kennedy);
id. at 7 (opening statement of Senator Muskie).
31. 516 F.2d at 659.
32. Id. at 665-66.
33. Id. at 667-68; see United States v. United States Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 302 (1972);
Senate Report, supra note 7, at 69.
34. Congress was careful to specify the exceptions it sought to create. They include: the
national security proviso, FCC personnel in the normal course of their duties and switchboard
operators and telephone company personnel in the normal course of their duties. 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2511(2), 2511(3) (1970). There is apparently only one judicially recognized exception. Simpson
v. Simpson, 490 F.2d 803, 809 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897 (1974) (no civil cause of action
for wiretapping by former husband--congressional intent was directed at organized crime). The
exception is a limited one however. See Remington v. Remington, 393 F. Supp. 898, 901 (E.D.
Pa. 1975) (court could not, as a matter of law, hold gross invasions of individual privacy by
unknown persons representing spouse to be not included in statutory proscription). On the danger
of creating exceptions, see 1974 Hearings, supra note 26, at 234-35 (testimony of Nicholas
Katzenbach); id. at 293 (testimony of Senator Nelson); 1972 Hearings, supra note 21, at 60-62
(statement of Nathan Lewin, former Assistant to Solicitor General).
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the statute is uniformity. 3 Congress sought to establish one uniform set of
standards and procedures that would apply to all electronic surveillance. This
policy might easily be frustrated if the courts were to embark upon a program
that would require the district courts to formulate their own standards and
procedures on an ad hoc basis. 36 Third, the plurality recognized the need, on
the part of the courts and the Executive, for clear guidance. 37 Finally, the
plurality stated that the Title HI standards and procedures are "salutary
prophylactic measures designed to protect privacy interests while still ac-
commodating the legitimate Executive need to conduct surveillance,"38
and noted, later in its opinion, that these standards and procedures were
probably the same as those which the courts would develop in any event.39
This is particularly likely in view of the fact that the standards and proce-
dures derive in large part from Berger and Katz.
D. The Minority Position
Judge Wilkey was unpersuaded by the plurality's reasoning. In his view the
section 2511 disclaimer represented the intent of Congress to avoid legislating
with respect to national security surveillance, whether or not subject to a
constitutional warrant requirement.4 0 He explained that in many instances
the primary purpose of electronic surveillance is not the gathering of evidence
of criminal activity, but rather, the gathering of information necessary to
protect the national security.4 ' Judge Wilkey pointed out that "the interre-
lated provisions of the Act are often totally inapposite to informational
surveillances. ,42
Judge Wilkey focused on the last sentence of the disclaimer which makes
"reasonableness" the test for admission into evidence of information gathered
pursuant to the President's national security and foreign affairs powers.4 3 He
construed this provision to require the kind of ad hoc determinations of
reasonableness which the plurality sought to avoid.44 The legislative history
of the provision is ambiguous: 45 it supports Judge Wilkey's view that reason-
35. 516 F.2d at 667; accord, Senate Report, supra note 7, at 66, 69.
36. The ad hoc approach has been criticized because: first, very few national security
surveillances become the subject of litigation; second, since most judicial decisions will be made
in camera there will be few precedents; and third, judges will perforce constantly be confronting
national security surveillance as an original question. See Harv. Note, supra note 26, at 995-96.
37. 516 F.2d at 667-68.
38. Id. at 668.
39. Id. at 668-69 & n.263.
40. Id. at 693 (Wilkey, J., concurring & dissenting).
41. Id. (Wilkey, J., concurring & dissenting).
42. Id. at 696 (Wilkey, J., concurring & dissenting).
43. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (1970); see 516 F.2d at 696-97 (Wilkey, J., concurring & dissenting),
citing Senate Report, supra note 7, at 94.
44. 516 F.2d at 697 (Wilkey, J., concurring & dissenting); see note 36 supra and accompany-
ing text. See generally Schwartz, The Legitimation of Electronic Eavesdropping: The Politics of
"Law and Order," 67 Mich. L. Rev. 455, 490-93 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Schwartz 1].
45. Senate Report, supra note 7, at 94. Both the plurality and Judge Wilkey quoted extensively
[Vol. 44
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ableness is the test of admission of all national security intelligence, but it also
supports the position that reasonableness is the test of admission only where
no warrant is constitutionally required.
Both Judge Wilkey and Judge MacKinnon emphasized what is probably
the weakest link in the plurality's argument, i.e., the probable cause standard
set up in Title III. The plurality had suggested that section 2511(3) should be
read to incorporate the appropriate standard of probable cause into section
2518 when intelligence gathering is involved. 46 Judge MacKinnon, on the
other hand, pointed out that "Congress certainly did not intend the statute to
be dissected in this manner." 47 judge Wilkey remarked that, "[i]f Congress
had intended to legislate with regard to information-gathering surveillances
... it would not have left it to the courts to guess which sections to enforce." 48
These arguments are particularly convincing in light of the fact that the probable
cause provisions lie "at the heart of Title I]l.1 49
E. The Basic Disagreement
At the core of the disagreement over the applicability of Title III to
informational surveillance lies the difference between the problems involved
in gathering national security intelligence by means of electronic surveillance
and those involved in uncovering evidence of criminal activity by the same
means. The plurality believed this difference to be sufficiently slight to require
only a minor modification of the statute's probable cause requirement.S But
judges Wright and MacKinnon believed it to be so great as to require the
courts to rewrite much of the statute.5' The difference, whatever its mag-
nitude, was recognized in Keith:
[D]omestic security surveillance may involve different policy and practical considera-
tions from the surveillance of "ordinary crime." The gathering of security intelligence
is often long range and involves the interrelation of various sources and types of
information. The exact targets of such surveillance may be more difficult to identify
than in surveillance operations against many types of crime specified in Title II.
Often, too, the emphasis of domestic intelligence gathering is on the prevention of
unlawful activity or the enhancement of the Government's preparedness for some
from this page. 516 F.2d at 665-66 n.240 (plurality opinion); id. at 693-94 (Wilkey, J., concurring
& dissenting).
46. 516 F.2d at 669-70 (plurality opinion). The plurality's theory was that, since under 18
U.S.C. § 2511(3) (1970) nothing in Title IE may disturb the President's constitutional power, and
since the probable cause standard in section 2518 and the list of crimes in section 2516 would
impair the President's power to conduct non-criminal surveillance, those sections should be read
so as to include, implicitly, an appropriate standard of probable cause under section 2518 and
national security intelligence gathering as a legitimate objective under section 2516.
47. 516 F.2d at 707 (MacKinnon, J., concurring & dissenting).
48. Id. at 698 (Wilkey, J., concurring & dissenting).
49. Id. at 697 (Wilkey, J., concurring & dissenting).
50. Id. at 669-70 (plurality opinion).
51. Id. at 696-97 (Wilkey, J., concurring & dissenting); id. at 706-07 (MacKinnon, J.,
concurring & dissenting).
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possible future crisis or emergency. Thus, the focus of domestic surveillance may be
less precise than that directed against more conventional types of crime.
3 2
It should be pointed out, however, that Title III did not result from
concern over "conventional types of crime." When conventional crimes such
as assault, robbery, murder, rape or others are under investigation, electronic
surveillance is of limited value because these crimes involve relatively little
advance planning between co-conspirators. s 3 Indeed, this kind of crime is
frequently committed by individuals acting alone. Electronic surveillance is
most useful in the investigation of organized crime and offenses such as
gambling or narcotics, and it is organized crime to which Title III primarily
addresses itself.
5 4
The use of intelligence gathering surveillance is by no means unique to the
national security field. In fact, the sort of surveillance techniques used in the
investigation of organized crime frequently involve what is referred to as the
gathering of " 'strategic' intelligence, '"5 - i.e., the surveillance of "known"
criminals in order to obtain advance information regarding criminal enter-
prises in which they may be involved. The purpose of such surveillance is
analogous to that of national security surveillance in that both are intended to
produce intelligence information.
5 6
It is likely that Congress was aware of the nature of "strategic intelligence"
gathering and of its value in the investigation of organized crime when it
enacted Title ]I1.5 7 Yet the probable cause requirement clearly outlaws the
unfocused gathering of "strategic intelligence" in a criminal context.5 8 One
52. United States v. United States Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 322 (1972).
53. Schwartz I, supra note 44, at 469, quoting Hearings on Controlling Crime Through More
Effective Law Enforcement Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 957-58 (1967) (testimony of Prof. G. Robert
Blakey).
54. United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 151 (1974); Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d 803, 806
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897 (1974); Senate Report, supra note 7, at 70-74; Schwartz, Six
Years of Tapping and Bugging, 1 Civ. Lib. Rev. 26 (Summer 1974) [hereinafter cited as
Schwartz II].
55. Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 648 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (plurality opinion); Schwartz I,
supra note 44, at 468.
56. See Schwartz H, supra note 54, at 30-31; Schwartz I, supra note 44, at 469-70 & n.65.
"Strategic intelligence" gathering is to be distinguished from the situation where law enforcement
authorities have probable cause with respect to one or more individuals and employ electronic
surveillance in order to learn who else is involved as well as the extent of the criminal enterprise.
Such a situation occurs most often in cases involving minimization which is discussed in part III,
section D, infra. See, e.g., United States v. Quintana, 508 F.2d 867, 874-75 (7th Cir. 1975);
United States v. James, 494 F.2d 1007, 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v. Cox, 462 F.2d
1293, 1300-01 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 918 (1974).
57. See Schwartz II, supra note 54, at 31; Schwartz I, supra note 44, at 469-70 & n.65.
58. United States v. Bernstein, 509 F.2d 996, 999 (4th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44
U.S.L.W. 3030 (U.S. July 22, 1975) (No. 74-1486); United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764, 779
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973). The Department of Justice once took the position that
under Keith domestic intelligence gathering is prohibited, and that Title III would have to be
amended in order to permit it. 1972 Hearings, supra note 21, at 23-24 (testimony of Mr.
Maroney). In 1969 Professor Schwartz presciently inquired, "if the Act does not grant law
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might well argue that the policy underlying Title M prohibits intelligence
gathering surveillance regardless of who it is directed against, unless it falls
within the category of surveillance for which no warrant is necessary. Of
course, under this interpretation of the statute mere intelligence gathering,
even with a warrant, would be impermissible, and it seems unlikely that the
courts will construe the statute so as to prohibit entirely a category of
surveillance with respect to which Congress sought not to legislate.5 9
If intelligence gathering surveillance is not banned completely by Title 1H,
and if the applicability of the Title IM safeguards depends upon the mag-
nitude of the difference between national security surveillance and ordinary
criminal surveillance, then it becomes important to examine the Title III
safeguards in order to determine whether the difference is great enough to
make them inappropriate in the national security context.
M. THE TITLE Il SAFEGUARDS AND NATIONAL SECURITY
INTELLIGENCE GATHERING
In addition to the probable cause requirement, section 2518 contains
several safeguards which may be either inappropriate, not constitutionally
required or in need of modification for national security intelligence gathering.
The balance of this Note will be devoted to an examination of the most
significant of those safeguards which include:
1) the particularization requirements:
a) identity of the subject
b) nature of the communication
2) the time provisions
3) the minimization requirement
4) the record keeping and warehousing provisions
5) the notice requirement
A. Particularization: The Subject
The particularization requirement derives from the fourth amendment. 60 In
Berger this fourth amendment requirement was said to be of peculiar impor-
enforcement officers the power to obtain allegedly crucial strategic information, will we not again
experience the same kind of widespread flouting of clear legal limitations that has recently come
to light?" Schwartz I, supra note 44, at 471 (footnote omitted). In 1974 the Roscoe Pound-
American Trial Lawyers Foundation adopted, by a substantial majority, the following recom-
mendation: "There should be no electronic surveillance for domestic intelligence purposes."
Annual Chief Justice Earl Warren Conference on Advocacy in the United States, June 7-8, 1974,
Privacy In A Free Society, Final Report 11 (1974).
59. Even the Zweibon plurality conceded its legitimacy. 516 F.2d at 669-70 & n.268; see Senate
Report, supra note 7, at 69; Schwartz I, supra note 44, at 490.
60. U.S. Const. amend. IV, provides, in part, "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized." If a warrant describes a particular conversation to be
intercepted from a particular location, then the constitution is probably satisfied notwithstanding
a failure to name the person to be overheard. See United States v. Fiorella, 468 F.2d 688, 691 (2d
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 917 (1974). Title III goes beyond the constitutional requirement
and provides that the speaker must be named if that person is "known." Id.
19751
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tance in the context of electronic surveillance. 61 Section 2518(1)(b)(iv) provides
that an application for a warrant must include the name of the persons to be
overheard, and section 2518(4)(a) requires that each authorizing order specify
the identity of the person subject to the surveillance. As the Supreme Court
noted in Keith, however, "[t]he exact targets of [security intelligence] surveil-
lance may be more difficult to identify than in surveillance operations ' 62 of a
conventional nature. It can be argued, on the basis of that language, that the
identification requirement should be relaxed or dispensed with when intelli-
gence gathering is involved. In view of the construction which the Supreme
Court has placed on the identification requirement, however, it is doubtful
whether a relaxation of the requirement is necessary.
In United States v. Kahn63 the Supreme Court considered a warrant
authorizing the tapping of telephones used by Irving Kahn and "others as yet
unknown. ' '64 Kahn and his wife were later indicted on gambling charges. The
evidence against Mrs. Kahn included an intercepted conversation between
herself and a "known gambling figure."' 65 At a suppression hearing this
conversation was ruled inadmissible as being outside the scope of the warrant
on the ground that Mrs. Kahn was not a person "as yet unknown. '66 A
divided Court of Appeals affirmed, but the Supreme Court reversed, 67
holding that the statute requires the naming of a person in the application or
interception order only when the law enforcement authorities have probable
cause to believe that the individual is "committing the offense" for which the
wiretap is sought.68
61. 388 U.S. at 56, citing Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966) (informer recorded his
own planned conversation with suspect); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961) ("spike
mike" used to monitor conversation in alleged gambling premises); On Lee v. United States, 343
U.S. 747 (1952) (informer wore transmitter during conversation with suspect); Goldman v. United
States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942) (detectaphone used to record conversations between informer and
suspect); see Schwartz I, supra note 44, at 464-65 & n.45. On the importance of the identification
requirement, see United States v. Curreri, 368 F. Supp. 757, 760 (D. Md. 1973), aff'd sub nom.
United States v. Bernstein, 509 F.2d 996, 999-1001 (4th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44
U.S.L.W. 3030 (U.S. July 22, 1975) (No. 74-1486).
62. 407 U.S. at 322 (1972).
63. 415 U.S. 143 (1974).
64. Id. at 145.
65. Id. at 147.
66. Id. at 149.
67. Kahn v. United States, 471 F.2d 191 (7th Cir. 1972), aff'd & rev'd in part, 415 U.S. 143
(1974).
68. 415 U.S. at 155; accord, United States v. Doolittle, 507 F.2d 1368 (5th Cir.), aff'd en
banc, 518 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3230 (U.S. Oct. 14, 1975)
(No. 75-513); United States v. Martinez, 498 F.2d 464 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1056
(1975); see United States v. Donovan, 513 F.2d 337 (6th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44
U.S.L.W. 3094 (U.S. Aug. 19, 1975) (75-212) (suspect should have been named); United States v.
Bernstein, 509 F.2d 996(4th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L. W. 3030 (U.S. July 22, 1975)
(No. 74-1486) (at time of first application probable cause existed with respect to suspect, but lie was
not"known" so failure to name him was not violative of the statute; at time of extension the suspect
was "known" and failure to name him required suppression).
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Thus, the identification requirement would seem to be a flexible one. So
that in an intelligence gathering situation, when "[t]he exact targets... may
be ... difficult to identify," 69 the failure to identify the target will not violate
the statute. On the other hand, where the target is identifiable, there seems
little reason why he or she should not be named.
The identification requirement is not just an important part of the fourth
amendment, it is also a part of an integrated statute. 7° Under present law
notice must be given to those named in the warrant,7' but notice need be
given to the unnamed subjects of surveillance only in the discretion of the
court.7 2 Justice Department officials have argued that the notice requirement
should be abrogated in the national security field. 7 3 If their arguments are
rejected by the courts, then they would naturally want the identification
requirement limited in order to reduce the impact of the notice requirement.
If the only justification for limiting the identification requirement is to
avoid giving notice, then it is likely that the argument for limitation would
fail, 7 4 and in view of the flexibility of the identification requirement it is
difficult to justify a limitation on any other ground. A warrant that fails to
identify its subject would look a great deal like a general warrant, and
considerably more authority than unsupported dictum from Keith should be
required before it is permitted.
B. Particularization: The Conversation
Title I also requires particularity with respect to the conversations to be
overheard. 7" Like the identification requirement, this requirement derives
from the fourth amendment which provides that warrants specify the "things
69. 407 U.S. at 322.
70. See notes 74-75 infra.
71. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (1970).
72. Id.; see United States v. Curreri, 368 F. Supp. 757, 760 (D. Md. 1973), affd sub nom,
United States v. Bernstein, 509 F.2d 996 (4th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed. 44 U.S.L.W.
3030 (U.S. July 22, 1975) (No. 74-1486); United States v. lanelli, 339 F. Supp. 171, 173-74 (W.D.
Pa. 1972, aff'd, 480 F.2d 907 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 918 (1974)
73. See note 129 infra and accompanying text.
74. See United States v. Moore, 513 F.2d 485, 497-98 & n.34 (D.C. Cir. 1975). and United
States v. Bernstein, 509 F.2d 996, 1000-01 (4th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U-S.L.W.
3030 (U.S. July 22, 1975) (No. 74-1486), for discussions of the importance of, and relationship
between, the notice and identification requirements. In Moore, the court explained that the
government may not wait until there is absolutely no doubt as to probable cause before it must
name a known individual. 513 F.2d at 496-97. Good faith is not an adequate justification for
omission. Id. at 497. It has been held, however, that omission can be excused if those who should
have been named were given notice and an opportunity to inspect the tapes and transcripts.
United States v. Kilgore, 518 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1975).
75. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518(1)(b)(iii), (4)(c) (1970). There exists a close relationship between the
particularization and minimization requirements because what must be minimized is determined
by reference to what has been specified. See Note, Minimization and the Fourth Amendment, 19
N.Y.L.F. 861, 870 (1974), in which the "plain view" doctrine, discussed in notes 79-81 infra and
accompanying text, is considered in the context of minimization.
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to be seized."'76 The requirement is thought to be an important one because it
prevents the "seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another.17
Language in Keith supports an argument that it is inapplicable to national
security intelligence gathering surveillance. 78 Again, however, the judicial
gloss on Title III may make a relaxation of this requirement unnecessary. The
rule against "seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another" has
been eroded in the conventional search and seizure situation by the "plain
view" doctrine which permits seizure of items in the plain view of law
enforcement authorities during the course of an otherwise lawful arrest 79 or
search.8 0 Section 2517(5) contains a statutory "plain view" provision which
permits a retroactive judicial approval of the interception of conversations
unrelated to those described in the warrant as long as the warrant was
otherwise lawful. 8'
United States v. Denisio82 is an extreme example of how "plain view" can
operate. The warrant in that case authorized the interception of conversations
related to robbery, bribery and conspiracy. The first few days of surveillance
proved unproductive with respect to those offenses, but produced evidence
of illegal bookmaking. On the basis of that evidence a search warrant was
obtained, and a search of the defendant's residence produced, in addition to
evidence of bookmaking, firearms for the possession of which the defendant
was convicted. An attempt to suppress the wiretap evidence was unsuccess-
ful. The result is entirely consistent with the "plain view" doctrine, but it is
difficult to reconcile with the prohibition against seizure of one thing under a
warrant describing another. It is difficult to quarrel with "plain view" because
it usually comes up in situations where, as in Denisio, the individual involved
has been engaged in a wide range of illegal activities. Nevertheless, the
existence of the rule makes it difficult to justify the relaxation of the
76. U.S. Const. amend. IV; see notes 60-61 supra and accompanying text.
77. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927). The Marron case was relied upon in
Berger. 388 U.S. at 58. See generally United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764, 778-81 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973); United States v. Vega, 52 F.R.D. 503, 505-07 (E.D.NY.
1971).
78. 407 U.S. at 322-23.
79. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947). The Marron case contributed to its own
demise for, although it held that a search warrant could not be used to seize things other than
those it described, it also held that when police officers made an arrest based on what they found
pursuant to a legal search they could seize things in the arrestee's possession and control.
'80. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971).
81. 18 U.S.C. § 2517(5) (1970); see United States v. Moore, 513 F.2d 485, 502 & n.53 (D.C.
Cir. 1975); United States v. Capra, 501 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 990 (1975)
(court suppressed evidence where government failed to seek judicial approval promptly); United
States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764, 781-83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973); United
States v. Mainello, 345 F. Supp. 863, 874-77 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); United States v. Sklaroff, 323 F.
Supp. 296, 307 (S.D. Fla. 1971), aff'd, 506 F.2d 837 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3205
(U.S. Oct 7, 1975) (No. 74-1249); United States v. Escandar, 319 F. Supp. 295, 300 (S.D. Fla. 1970);
People v. Sher, 68 Misc. 2d 917, 923-24, 329 N.Y.S.2d 2, 9-10 (Greene County Ct. 1972) (Werker, J,).
82. 360 F. Supp. 715 (D. Md. 1973).
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particularization requirement. Furthermore, the retention of the particulariza-
tion requirement will help to assure that when individual privacy is to be
invaded, law enforcement authorities will at least have something specific in
mind when the warrant is sought.8 3
C. The Time Provisions
In Berger, the Supreme Court found that the time provisions of the New
York statute were defective because they permitted what was, in effect, a
series of intrusions pursuant to a single showing of probable cause. 84 The
statute permitted interceptions up to 60 days in duration. Title m now limits
electronic surveillance to 30 days, 5 and the courts of appeals have upheld
this provision.8 6 Although both statutes permit, or permitted, an unlimited
number of extensions, and thus extremely long periods of surveillance, there
is little objection to these provisions so long as a renewed showing of probable
cause is required in order to obtain an extension. The important issue, with
respect to time, is whether judicial review of continuing surveillance should
occur often or seldom.8 7
Law enforcement officials assert that a 30 day limitation is excessively
burdensome in the national security field, and suggest that 90 days would be
more appropriate.88 Legislation proposed by Senator Gaylord Nelson would
83. "Given the possibility of such long-term eavesdropping, Berger's requirement that the
'property' sought-the conversation-be described with particularity in the warrant becomes all
the more important, at least theoretically. The wider the possible temporal or spatial area of a
permissible search, the more important it is that the description of what is sought be precise, for
imposing such a limitation may be the only way to discourage indiscriminate searches of extensive
areas." Schwartz I, supra note 44, at 463. Compare United States v. Perillo, 333 F. Supp. 914,
921-22 (D. Del. 1971).
84. "[The Court in Berger reserved its strongest criticism of the New York law for the
section allowing a dragnet-like surveillance for periods of sixty days and longer, saying it was,
like the odious general warrants of colonial times, 'the equivalent of a series of intrusions,
searches, and seizures pursuant to a single showing of probable cause.' " United States v. Cox,
462 F.2d 1293, 1303 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 918 (1974) (footnotes omitted),
quoting Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59 (1967); see note 146 infra and accompanying text (a
copy of a writ of assistance [general warrant] is provided in the appendix). A single showing of
probable cause probably justifies more than one interception. See Schwartz I, supra note 44, at
463-64.
85. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1970).
86. See note 10 supra.
87. See United States v. Cox, 462 F.2d 1293, 1303-04 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
918 (1974); United States v. Cafero, 473 F.2d 489, 497 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 918
(1974); United States v. Mainello, 345 F. Supp. 863, 872-73 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Harv. Note, supra
note 26, at 998.
88. "Unlike conventional criminal investigations [domestic intelligence inquiries) have no
built-in necessary, automatic conclusion. They continue as long as there is a perceived threat."
Levi Address, supra note 18, at 9; see 1974 Hearings, supra note 26, at 498-99 (testimony of
William B. Saxbe) (Justice Department regulation provides for reauthorization every ninety days);
1972 Hearings, supra note 21, at 55 (testimony of Ramsey Clark) (three months is "often
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limit surveillance to 15 days, but would permit extensions of national security
surveillance without a de novo showing of probable cause.8 9 It is doubtful
whether either suggestion would be permitted under Berger, for both
permit long-term interception on the basis of a single showing of probable
cause.
Nevertheless, the Executive branch has a legitimate need to conduct
effective national security intelligence gathering, and if the thirty day limit is too
short to satisfy that need, then it should be changed. The Keith Court recognized
that national security surveillance is often long-range in nature, and suggested
that this might affect the standards to be applied in such cases. 90
Whether the long-range nature of national security surveillance is unique is
subject to question. Criminal investigations are often long-range enter-
prises,9' and yet many judges require, pursuant to the discretion granted to
them in Title III, progress reports as frequently as every five days. 92 This
places a burden on the government and the courts, but it is a commendable
practice: one indicative of the caution and concern for individual privacy that
should be the hallmark of effective judicial supervision of electronic surveil-
lance.9 3 There is no evidence that this practice has decreased the effectiveness
of surveillance directed at conventional crime, and there is no evidence that it
will have such an effect in the national security context.
enough'). The ninety day regulation was still in effect when Zweibon was decided. 516 F.2d at
610 & n.26.
89. S. 2820, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 5(b)(5) (1973). A section analysis of the bill is found in
1974 Hearings, supra note 26, at 271-78. The bill is examined in Committee Report, supra note 5.
Compare American Bar Association Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Electronic
Surveillance § 5.9 (1974) which suggests a fifteen day limit with a thirty day extension available
only on showing of probable cause. It is difficult to understand why less should be required for
renewal than for authorization. Logically, renewal should be more difficult. If the initial period
has been fruitful, then it will be easy to make a stronger showing, but if it produced nothing, then
some explanation should be required. See Harv. Note, supra note 26, at 998-99.
90. 407 U.S. at 322.
91. See Schwartz I, supra note 44, at 470. Between 1968 and 1973 the average federal
criminal wiretap lasted for thirteen and a half days. On 3,492 installations during that period,
1,323 extensions were granted. This would indicate that many installations lasted for consider-
able periods of time. See Schwartz II, supra note 54, at 29. Between 1968 and 1970 the average
national security tap lasted from 78.3 to 290.7 days. There was an average of about 100 such taps
each year. Id. at 34.
92. See, e.g., United States v. Quintana, 508 F.2d 867, 875 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Cox, 462 F.2d 1293, 1301 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 918 (1974).
93. The Act is constitutional because it requires strict judicial supervision. United States v.
Martinez, 498 F.2d 464, 468 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1056 (1975). Section 801(d) of
the original Act, which contained legislative fact finding, acknowledged the important role played
by the judiciary in the protection of individual privacy. In the six years since Title IlI became
effective only five or six requests for warrants have been denied by the judiciary. Schwartz II,
supra note 54, at 33. A good example of close judicial supervision may be found in United States
v. Bynum, 360 F. Supp. 400, 407-19 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 485 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated on
other grounds, 417 U.S. 903 (1974) (frequently referring to District Judge Travia's continuing
review of the wiretap involved).
1975] ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
Frequent judicial supervision provides a bulwark against unjustified intru-
sions into the sensitive areas of privacy and first amendment rights. 94 The
innocent targets of national security surveillance are no less deserving of the
protection afforded by time limitations than are innocent targets of conven-
tional surveillance. Indeed, they may be more deserving of protection because
they will be subjected to intrusions when there is no probable cause to believe
they are committing a crime.
D. Minimization
Few of section 2518's provisions have been litigated more frequently than
the minimization provision of subsection 5.95 In a national security intelli-
gence gathering context, good arguments can be made that minimization will
be difficult if not impossible. Since there may be uncertainty regarding the
targets of the surveillance, it may be difficult to decide to whom to listen. 96
Uncertainty regarding the nature of the conversations to be overheard may
make it difficult to separate the relevant from the irrelevant.97 Codes or
foreign languages may be employed to confuse or mislead those conducting
the surveillance. 98 Finally, the targets of surveillance may attempt to deceive
law enforcement authorities by beginning their conversations in an innocent
manner in the hope that after a few minutes the tap will be turned off.99
94. Former Assistant to the Solicitor General Nathan Lewin considers the time provisions to
be a "substantial restraint," and to be among the "more effective practical checks" on abuses.
1972 Hearings, supra note 21, at 61.
95. See, e.g., United States v. Turner, No. 73-2740 (9th Cir., July 24, 1975) (per curiam); United
States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d 29, 42-46 (3d Cir. 1975); United States v. Quintana, 50 F.2d 867 (7th
Cir. 1975); United States v. Cafero, 473 F.2d 489 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 918 (1974);
United States v. King, 335 F. Supp. 523, 540-45 (S.D. Cal. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 478 F.2d
494 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 826 (1973). See generally Note, Minimization and the Fourth
Amendment, 19 N.Y.L.F. 861 (1974).
96. United States v. Turner, No. 73-2740 at 12, 15-17 (9th Cir., July 24, 1975) (per curtam);
United States v. Capra, 501 F.2d 267, 274 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 990 (1975); United
Statesv. James, 494 F.2d 1007, 1019-20 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v. Cox, 462 F.2d 1293, 1301
(8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 918 (1974); United States v. Falcone, 364 F. Supp. 877, 882
(D.N.J. 1973), aff'd, 505 F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 955 (1975).
97. United States v. Turner, No. 73-2740, at 12 (9th Cir., July 24, 1975) (per curiam); United
States v. Cirillo, 499 F.2d 872, 880 & n.6 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1056 (1974); United States
v. James, 494 F.2d 1007, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1020 (1975); United Statesv.
Bynum, 485 F.2d 490, 500 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated on other grounds, 417 U.S. 903 (1974); United
States v. Cox, 462 F.2d 1293, 1301 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 918(1974); United States v.
LaGorga, 336 F. Supp. 190, 196 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
98. United States v. Turner, No. 73-2740 at 17 (9th Cir., July 24, 1975) (per curiam); United
States v. Capra, 501 F.2d 267, 273 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 990 (1975); United States v.
Cirillo, 499 F.2d 872, 881 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1056 (1974); United States v. James, 494
F.2d 1007, 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v. Bynum, 360 F. Supp. 400, 412-13 (S.D.N. Y.),
aff'd, 485 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated on other grounds, 417 U.S. 903 (1974); United States v.
Focarile, 340 F. Supp. 1033, 1048 (D. Md.), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Giordano. 469 F.2d 522
(4th Cir. 1972), aff'd on other grounds, 416 U.S. 505 (1974).
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These considerations are by no means unique to the national security field.
They have been successfully advanced and accepted in cases involving
ordinary criminal surveillance. In United States v. Quintana,100 the govern-
ment intercepted all incoming and outgoing calls from the defendant's store
and home for a period of 35 days. "Some 2000 calls were intercepted, while
only 153 were ultimately found germane enough to be worth transcribing, and
only 47 were used at trial."''° The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
held that surveillance of this kind was not a per se violation of the statute. 102
The Court explained that whether the minimization requirement has been
complied with depends on a "case-by-case analysis of the reasonableness of
[each] particular interception."'10 3 The Court held that the government had
made a prima facie showing of reasonableness based upon the following
factors: the criminal enterprise under investigation was a large and sophisti-
cated narcotics conspiracy, and the surveillance was designed as much to
learn the identity of co-conspirators and the extent of the conspiracy as it was
to incriminate the defendant whose phone was tapped; 0 4 many conversations
contained a mix of relevant and irrelevant conversations and there was no
pattern of innocent conversation that would indicate to the agents monitoring
the tap that the conversation should not be intercepted; 05 the authorizing
judge exercised continuing supervision of the tap and required the govern-
ment to submit reports at five-day intervals.' 0 6
Thus, although it is clear that national security surveillance can pose
difficult minimization problems for law enforcement authorities, it is not at all
clear that these difficulties will be any greater than in many criminal
cases-unless it be assumed that members of organized crime or narcotics
conspiracies are somehow less proficient at eluding law enforcement au-
thorities than their counterparts in the fields of espionage and subversion. In
addition, it is far from clear that, under present law, the minimization
requirement is sufficiently inflexible to impose any substantial burden on law
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 955 (1975); United States v. Bynum, 360 F. Supp. 400, 412-13
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 485 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated on other grounds, 417 U.S. 903 (1974); cf.
United States v. Cirillo, 499 F.2d 872, 880 n.6 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1056 (1974).
100. 508 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1975). The Third Circuit appears to be in complete accord with
Quintana. See United States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d 29, 42-46 (3d Cir. 1975).
101. 508 F.2d at 873.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 873-74.
104. Id. at 874; see United States v. Falcone, 364 F. Supp. 877, 885 (D.N.J. 1973), aff'd, 505
F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 955 (1975); United States v. Focarile, 340 F.
Supp. 1033, 1047 (D. Md.), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Giordano, 469 F.2d 522 (4th Cir,
1972), aff'd on other grounds, 416 U.S. 505 (1974); United States v. Escandar, 319 F. Supp. 295,
303 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
105. 508 F.2d at 875.
106. Id.; accord, United States v. Bynum, 485 F.2d 490, 501 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated on other
grounds, 417 U.S. 903 (1974) (summaries and logs submitted at intervals of four to eight days);
United States v. Escandar, 319 F. Supp. 295, 303 (S.D. Fla. 1970); see note 92 supra and
accompanying text.
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enforcement. 0 7 Indeed, the contrary appears to be the fact because under
Quintana and similar cases all that is required is a good faith attempt to
minimize' 0 8-a requirement that can hardly be expected to place an undue
burden on any kind of surveillance.
E. Warehousing and Record Keeping
Under section 2518(8)(a), the fruits of electronic surveillance must, if
possible, be recorded on tape in such a way as to prevent editing or alteration.
Immediately after the warrant expires, the tapes must be presented to the
issuing judge for sealing, and they must be preserved for ten years.' 0 9 These
provisions serve two functions: they preserve the integrity and accuracy of the
recordings, 10 and they insure that a record will be available if the legality of
the interception is later challenged."'
In Zweibon the original recordings were destroyed, and only summaries
were available to the court. 1 2 Although the Justice Department has made
conflicting representations regarding government policy with respect to record
keeping," 3 it is clear that it would prefer to produce its own summaries of
107. The statute merely "requires that measures be adopted to reduce the extent of such
interception to a practical minimum while allowing the legitimate aims of the Government to be
pursued." United States v. Turner, No. 73-2740 at 15 (9th Cir., July 24, 1975) (per curiam).
108. United States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d 29, 44 (3d Cir. 1975); United States v. Quintana,
508 F.2d 867, 875 (7th Cir. 1975) (citing cases which stand for the proposition that frequent
judicial review of surveillance makes it easier to find that a good faith attempt has been made);
see United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764, 784 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973)
("on the whole the agents have shown a high regard for the right of privacy and have done all
they reasonably could to avoid unnecessary intrusion.'); United States v. Falcone, 364 F. Supp.
877, 886-87 (D.N.J. 1973), aff'd, 505 F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 955 (1975);
United States v. Scott, 331 F. Supp. 233, 248 (D.D.C. 1971), vacated & remanded, 504 F.2d 194
(D.C. Cir. 1974) (subsequent order on remand, not reported officially, was reversed at 516 F.2d
751 (D.C. Cir. 1975) [District Court suppressed all conversations intercepted in view of what it
considered the agent's failure to observe minimization requirements-Court of Appeals found the
minimization standard to be one of reasonableness which was comported with in all intercep-
tions]).
109. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(a) (1970).
110. United States v. Sklaroff, 506 F.2d 837 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3205
(U.S. Oct. 7, 1975) (No. 74-1249); Senate Report, supra note 7, at 104. The sealing and warehousing
provisions also serve to preserve the confidential nature of the recordings. United States v. Falcone,
505 F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 955 (1975); Senate Report, supra note 7, at 104.
Nathan Lewin ranks the record keeping and warehousing provisions among the more effective
practical checks on abuses. 1972 Hearings, supra note 21, at 61. A moderate delay in sealing can be
excused if the government was acting in good faith. United States v. Poeta, 455 F.2d 117, 122 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 948 (1972).
111. United States v. Huss, 482 F.2d 38, 47-48 (2d Cir. 1973); Senate Report, supra note 7, at
104; see United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642, 650-53 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (criminal conviction
remanded because government had lost tapes sought by defendants).
112. 516 F.2d at 605 n.10 (plurality opinion).
113. Id.; cf. 1974 Hearings, supra note 26, at 449 (statement of John Shattuck and Leon
Friedman of American Civil Liberties Union).
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conversations for court inspection rather than original tapes. Apparently, the
only justification advanced in favor of destruction is a concern for warehous-
ing space."14
Despite its primary purpose, national security intelligence is often sought to
be introduced in evidence in criminal trials. The Zweibon case is a classic
example. 1-"5 In the context of a criminal trial it becomes vitally important that
accurate and complete records be made available. For example, if the
government failed to minimize its interceptions, that fact would be unlikely to
appear in summaries because summaries would not be made of irrelevant
conversations. Another example of the importance of having original record-
ings rather than summaries may be found in United States v. Huss. 116 That
case arose from a contempt proceeding that developed out of the same Jewish
Defense League wiretaps involved in Zweibon. 117 At trial, a witness refused
to answer questions posed by government attorneys on the ground that the
questions were based on information gathered pursuant to an illegal wiretap.
The issue became whether the questions were based on wiretap information
or on an independent source untainted by the wiretap."18 The trial judge
concluded that there had been an independent, untainted source." 1 9 How-
ever, the witness claimed that actual tape recordings, which the government
had destroyed, would prove the contrary, and that the destruction made it
impossible for him to rebut the government's case.' 20 His own case was
particularly strong because he had his own tapes of conversations with one of
the government's agents that indicated that he had been "fingered" by
wiretaps.' 2' The contempt order was vacated because the government had
placed the witness in the absurd position of having to prove taint without all
of the means necessary to do so. 122 A Second Circuit case decided after
Huss123 indicates that, where a strong showing of independent source is
made, the destruction of tapes will not result in the suppression of evidence
allegedly obtained through illegal wiretaps. 24
Even if intelligence surveillance were not used in criminal trials, the ware-
housing provisions would still be important. There are both statutory and
common law causes of action for illegal electronic surveillance. 125 In order to
114. See United States v. Huss, 482 F.2d 38, 48 (2d Cir. 1973).
115. Others are United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 881
(1974); United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960 (1974).
116. 482 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1973). See also United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642, 650-53 (D.C.
Cir. 1971).
117. 516 F.2d at 668 n.256.
118. United States v. Huss, 482 F.2d 38, 42 (2d Cir. 1973).
119. Id. at 45.
120. Id. at 46-47. Under Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 183 (1969), the
government has the burden of persuasion to show lack of taint, but the defendant bears a burden
of going forward with evidence of taint.
121. United States v. Huss, 482 F.2d 38, 49 (2d Cir. 1973).
122. Id. at 51.
123. United States v. Garcilaso de la Vega, 489 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1974).
124. Id. at 764-65.
125. The statutory provision is contained in 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1970). Under Zweibon this
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prevail in such an action, the plaintiff must show that the surveillance
violated either the fourth amendment or Title III. To require such a plaintiff
to carry his burden of proof without accurate records of the surveillance
would be just as absurd as requiring the witness in Huss to show taint under
the same conditions.
F. Notice
One of the constitutional flaws the Berger Court found in the New York
statute was its failure to afford notice to the targets of surveillance. 12 6 Section
2518(8)(d) represents an attempt to comply with Berger. 127 Subjects of surveil-
lance must be given notice within a reasonable time from the termination of
the period of the warrant. Absent judicial approval, notice may not be
postponed beyond 90 days. 128 Former Attorneys General Richardson and Saxbe
and former Deputy Attorney General Ruckelshaus have all asserted that this
requirement is "obviously inappropriate for national security intelligence
gathering surveillances.' 2 9 The rationale behind this assertion appears to be
that notice will "blow the cover" of the government, and impair or destroy the
usefulness of the wiretap.131 It is important to define the kind of notice involved.
The notice required by Berger and the statute is post-search notice, not prior
notice. Prior notice is neither constitutionally nor statutorily required.13'
Post-search notice is required after the surveillance terminates so that the subject
of the surveillance will be able to vindicate his rights if the surveillance was
illegal. 132
In a large-scale, long-range intelligence operation, law enforcement au-
thorities may be conducting a series of surveillances and may be relying on a
broad range of sources of information. 133 Such an operation could be severely
jeopardized by premature notification of even one target of surveillance, for
provision of Title III applies to national security surveillance. A common law cause of action %as
recognized in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971).
126. 388 U.S. at 60.
127. See Senate Report, supra note 7, at 105.
128. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8Xd) (1970). The Nelson bill, discussed at note 89 supra and
accompanying text, contains a stricter provision that is examined in depth in Committee Report,
supra note 5, at 764-66.
129. 1974 Hearings, supra note 26, at 17 (testimony of Elliot Richardson); see id. at 331
(testimony of William Ruckelshaus) (discussing surveillance of foreigners); id. at 493-94 (tes-
timony of William Saxbe). But see 1972 Hearings, supra note 21, at 51-52 (testimony of Ramsey
Clark).
130. 1974 Hearings, supra note 26, at 494 (testimony of William Saxbe).
131. See United States v. Martinez, 498 F.2d 464, 468 (6th Cir. 1974). cerL denied. 419 U.S.
1056 (1975).
132. United States v. Bernstein, 509 F.2d 996, 1000-01 (4th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed,
44 U.S.L.W. 3030 (U.S. July 22, 1975) (No. 74-1486); Committee Report, supra note 5, at 764;
Senate Report, supra note 7, at 105; Schwartz II, supra note 54, at 33; Schwartz I, supra note 44,
at 484; Harv. Note, supra note 26, at 999-1000; 1972 Hearings, supra note 21, at 61-62 (statement
of Nathan Lewin) (notice is one of the more effective practical checks on abuses).
133. United States v. United States Dist. CL, 407 U.S. 297, 322 (1972).
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that person is likely to inform all of the others involved.1 34 Similarly, a
fruitful source of intelligence may be used for a period of time, and then
terminated, in the hope that when future intelligence is needed the source will
again be available. Such a source would be rendered useless if notice were
given after the first surveillance because the target would always be suspi-
cious thereafter.
The Act itself, of course, permits notice to be postponed upon an ex parte
showing of good cause,' 35 and the Senate Committee Report points out that
in a national security context, notice could be postponed almost
indefinitely13 6-- an indication that the notice requirement was expected to be
applied to such surveillance. Even if postponement were not available,
however, the flexibility of the notice provision supports an argument that it be
applied to intelligence gathering surveillances.
The courts have explained that the notice requirement "is not meaningless.
It eliminates, insofar as practicable, the possibility of completely secret
electronic eavesdropping and grants to the person involved an opportunity to
seek redress .... ",137 and that it is "an absolutely necessary link in the chain
of protective measures built into the statute.' 38 In practice the provision has
not been strictly enforced, however, and seldom does a failure to serve notice
within 90 days or within the period permitted by any extension result in
suppression. 39 The cases refer to the notice requirement as a "ministerial' 140
provision, and absent a deliberate attempt to flout the statute14 1 there may be
no remedy for a failure to give notice. If the defendant has actual knowl-
edge,'42 or if he was not prejudiced by the delay, 143 suppression may be
134. See United States v. John, 508 F.2d 1134, 1139 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 962
(1975).
135. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8Xd); see United States v. John, 508 F.2d 1134 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 962 (1975); United States v. Wolk, 466 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1972).
136. Senate Report, supra note 7, at 105.
137. United States v. Eastman, 326 F. Supp. 1038, 1039 (M.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd, 465 F.2d
1057 (3d Cir. 1972).
138. Id.
139. E.g., id.; United States v. Chun, 386 F. Supp. 91 (D. Hawaii 1974).
140. United States v. Smith, 463 F.2d 710 (10th Cir. 1972); United States v. Lawson, 334 F.
Supp. 612 (E.D. Pa. 1971). But see United States v. Eastman, 465 F.2d 1057, 1062 (3d Cir.
1972).
141. United States v. Eastman, 465 F.2d 1057, 1062 (3d Cir. 1972). But see United States v.
Donovan, 513 F.2d 337, 343 (6th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3094 (U.S. Aug.
19, 1975) (75-212).
142. United States v. Wolk, 466 F.2d 1143, 1146 (8th Cir. 1972). But see United States v.
Bernstein, 509 F.2d 996, 1004 (4th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3030 (U.S.
July 22, 1975) (No. 74-1486).
143. United States v. Rizzo, 492 F.2d 443, 447 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 944 (1974);
United States v. Smith, 463 F.2d 710 (10th Cir. 1972); United States v. LaGorga, 336 F. Supp.
190, 194 (W.D. Pa. 1971); United States v. Lawson, 334 F. Supp. 612, 616-17 (E.D. Pa. 1971);
United States v. Cantor, 328 F. Supp. 561 (E.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd, 470 F.2d 890 (3d Cir. 1972).
But see United States v. Bernstein, 509 F.2d 996, 1004 (4th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44
U.S.L.W. 3030 (U.S. July 22, 1975) (No. 74-1486). In the Chun case, the court examined the
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denied. Whether a failure to give notice gives rise to a civil cause of action is
unknown-probably because those who have the right to bring such actions
are unaware of the fact.
Perhaps the most insidious feature of electronic surveillance is its secrecy.
The target's unawareness of the surveillance is at once the feature that makes
it valuable and the feature that makes it susceptible of great abuse. Although
it is important that the value of such surveillance be preserved for as long as
necessary, it is equally important that the target be notified when secrecy is no
longer necessary. Section 2518(8)(d) with its notification and postponement
provisions is nothing more than a device by means of which both interests can
be accommodated. 144
IV. CONCLUSION
An analysis of the problems that law enforcement authorities are likely to
face in the context of national security intelligence gathering reveals that these
problems are usually not any greater than those faced in difficult criminal
investigations. This analysis suggests that, at least until Congress can develop
something better, it is desirable that the Justice Department proceed under,
and that the courts apply, Title III to all surveillances to which the warrant
requirement applies. Even Justice Department officials have conceded that, in
the criminal context, "Title M works well,"'14s and there is little reason to
believe that its provisions will be any less workable in the national security
context. Perhaps the best argument in favor of applying Title M to national
security intelligence gathering would be a warrant that failed to comply with
the provisions discussed above. It would not contain the names of those
whose conversations are expected to yield information. It would not describe
the types of conversations anticipated. It would last as long as there was a
perceived threat. The officials executing the warrant would not be required to
minimize the intrusion. After the interception few records would remain, and
recordings would be destroyed instead of being sealed by the issuing judge.
Finally, the only targets of surveillance who would be notified would be those
who were subsequently prosecuted-and then only in response to defense
discovery motions.
It is instructive to recall that the writ of assistance against which James
Otis unsuccessfully argued in 1761146 contained similar features and became a
notice requirement closely and concluded that prejudice is a constitutional test, i.e., if there has
been prejudice, then the Constitution has been violated notwithstanding compliance with the
statute. United States v. Chun, 386 F. Supp. 91, 94 (D. Hawaii 1974).
144. The Nelson bill has been criticized because its postponement provision is not sufficiently
flexible. Committee Report, supra note 5, at 765.
145. 1974 Hearings, supra note 26, at 494 (testimony of William Saxbe).
146. There exists no formal record of James Otis' Speech Against the Writs of Assistance.
John Adams took notes of the speech however and G. R. Minot later expanded these notes into
the version of argument which Adams revised. H. Commager, Documents of American History
45 (3d ed. 1947). Otis argued that the writ, which is reprinted in the appendix to this Note,
contained the following illegal features (parenthetical indications after each refer to the numbers
corresponding to the numbers of the constitutional shortcomings of the New York statute
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major tool for oppression. The fourth amendment was fashioned to prohibit
the use of such general writs, and Title III does not purport to be anything
more than an attempt to conform with the requirements of the fourth
amendment. Until it can be shown that Title III is in fact too burdensome
and too inflexible to be applied in the context of national security intelligence
gathering, its provisions should prevail.
Thomas I. Sheridan III
APPENDIX
Writ of Assistance
The following is a copy of the Writ of Assistance that was issued to "Surveyor &
Searcher" Charles Paxton at the request of Thomas Lechmere, the "Surveyor General"
of the Port of Boston, on December 2, 1761. The copy is taken from W. MacDonald,
Documentary Source Book of American History 1606-1898, at 106-09 (1908). Although
the writ does not indicate the fact, MacDonald, in his prefatory notes, informs us that
the writ was effective until the demise of the Crown and for six months thereafter. Id.
at 106. It was legalized by the Townshend Revenue Act of 1767 which is reprinted in
id. at 143-46. This general warrant is included here for two reasons: first, the fourth
amendment was largely an attempt to outlaw the Writ of Assistance and it is therefore
important to understand what that document said; second, despite its importance, it is
a difficult document to find. The reader should note that, in the manuscript Mac-
Donald used, the words in brackets are interlined, and those in italics erased.
George the third by the grace
Prov. of of God of Great Britan France
Mass. Bay & Ireland King Defender of the
faith &c.
To All & singular our Justices
of the peace Sheriffs Constables
SEAL and to all other our Officers
and Subjects within our said
Province and to each of you
Greeting.
Know Ye that whereas in and by an Act of Parliament made in the thir[fourlteenth
year of [the reign of] the late King Charles the second it is declared to be [the Officers
of our Customs & their Deputies are authorized and impowered to go & enter aboard
any Ship or Vessel outward or inward bound for the purposes in the said Act
mentioned and it is also in & by the said Act further enacted & declared that it shall
be] lawful [to or] for any person or persons authorized by Writ of assistants under the
seal of our Court of Exchequer to take a Constable Headborough or other publick
involved in Berger listed in note 5 supra):" 1) it was directed to everyone; anyone could exercise
the power it conferred; 2) it was perpetual (10); 3) probable cause was not required (1); 4) it was
a general warrant, i.e., it authorized a search of any place for any things (2 & 4); 5) no oath was
required; 6) there was no return (8).
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Officer inhabiting near unto the place and in the day time to enter & go into any House
Shop Cellar Warehouse or Room or other place and in case of resistance to break open
doors chests trunks & other package there to seize and from thence to bring any kind
of goods or merchandize whatsoever prohibited & uncustomed and to put and secure
the same in his Majestys [our] Storehouse in the port next to the place where such
seizure shall be made.
And Whereas in & by an Act of Parliament made in the seventh & eighth year of
[the reign of the late] King William the third there is granted to the Officers for
collecting and managing our revenue and inspecting the plantation trade in any of our
plantations [the same powers & authority for visiting & searching of Ships & also] to
enter houses or warehouses to search for and seize any prohibited or uncustomed goods
as are provided for the Officers of our Customs in England by the said last mentioned
Act made in the fourteenth year of [the reign of] King Charles the Second, and the like
assistance is required to be given to the said Officers in the execution of their office as
by the said last mentioned Act is provided for the Officers in England.
And Whereas in and by an Act of our said Province of Massachusetts bay made in
the eleventh year of [the reign of] the late King William the third it is enacted &
declared that our Superior Court of Judicature Court of Assize and General Goal
delivery for our said Province shall have cognizance of all matters and things within
our said Province as fully & amply to all intents & purposes as our Courts of King's
Bench Common Pleas & Exchequer within our Kingdom of England have or ought to
have.
And Whereas our Commissioners for managing and causing to be levied & collected
our customs subsidies and other duties have [by Commission or Deputation under their
hands & seal dated at London the 22d day of May in the first year of our Reign]
deputed and impowered Charles Paxton Esquire to be Surveyor & Searcher of all the
rates and duties arising and growing due to us at Boston in our Province aforesaid and
[in & by said Commission or Deputation] have given him power to enter into [any Ship
Bottom Boat or other Vessel & also into] any Shop House Warehouse Hostery or other
place whatsoever to make diligent search into any trunk chest pack case truss or any
other parcell or package whatsoever for any goods wares or merchandize prohibited to
be imported or exported or whereof the Customs or other Duties have not been duly
paid and the same to seize to our use In all things proceeding as the Law directs.
Therefore we strictly Injoin & Command you & every one of you that, all excuses
apart, you & every one of you permit the said Charles Pa.xton according to the true
intent & form of the said commission or deputation and the laws & statutes in that
behalf made & provided, [as well by night as by day from time to time to enter & go on
board any Ship Boat or other Vessel riding lying or being within or coming to the said
port of Boston or any Places or Creeks thereunto appertaining such Ship Boat or
Vessel then & there found to search & oversee and the persons therein being strictly to
examine touching the premises aforesaid & also according to the form effect and trme
intent of the said commission or deputation] in the day time to enter & go into the
vaults cellars warehouses shops & other places where any prohibited goods wares or
merchandizes or any goods wares or merchandizes for which the customs or other
duties shall not have been duly & truly satisfied and paid lye concealed or are
suspected to be concealed, according to the true intent of the law to inspect & oversee
& search for the said goods wares & merchandize, And further to do and execute all
things which of right and according to the laws & statutes in this behalf shall be to be
done. And we further strictly Injoin & Command you and every one of you that to the
said Charles Paxton Esqr you & every one of you from time to time be aiding assisting
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& helping in the execution of the premises as is meet. And this you or any of (you] in
no wise omit at your perils. Witness Thomas Hutchinson Esq at Boston the day
of December in the Second year of our Reign Annoque Dom 1761
By order of Court
N. H. Cler.
